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The More Things Change ...
Governance and Resistance along
the Mexico–Guatemala Border
Carla Angulo-Pasel *

With the politics of borders, the socio-economic divide between the United States and
Mexico is evident. The geographic proximity to the U.S. makes the Mexico–Guatemala
border an extension of the U.S. border enforcement regime. This article argues that the
politics surrounding the U.S.–Guatemala border have not necessarily changed, because, at
the core, the main objective of these border governance practices is to stop the movement
of undesirable bodies (Khosravi 2011). Further, the article argues that the practices of
containment force migrants to resist through their movement and seek strategies of
survival. By comparing the administrations of Peña Nieto and López Obrador (AMLO) and
analyzing the survival strategy of migrant “caravans” through border policy analysis and
fieldwork conducted in 2014, I show that this border is a site of struggle between the state’s
power and migrants’ forms of resistance. I find that border tactics are influenced by U.S.
border enforcement requirements of increased militarization and policing, but also aim to
restrict and control certain populations. The result is the perpetual securitization of people
and the militarization of pathways. Migrants, however, also employ forms of organizing
such as travelling in mass groups to achieve safe passage, thus exercising their agency
through movement. The bordering practices and the forms of resistance indicate that this
border is a constant site of struggle that requires further examination.

Introduction
Compared to the United States–Mexico border, Mexico’s
southern border has been described by scholars and
social activists (Ruiz et al. 2020; Meyer & Isacson 2019)
as long, porous, and sparsely populated. Yet, Mexico’s
border policy for its southern border with Guatemala
continuously receives both political attention and
military aid. To a large extent, this attention has to do
with the dependent bilateral relationship between
Mexico and the U.S. vis-à-vis prominent issues such as
immigration, trade, and drug trafficking. Multiple U.S.
administrations have used the important bilateral trade
relationship to pressure Mexican governments to act

as a “buffer state”, to contain and restrict northward
migration of now primarily Central American migrants
coming from the so-called Northern Triangle of Central
America: Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras
(Isacson et al. 2015; Meyer & Isacson 2019). The target
populations of these border enforcement policies
appear to be those deemed by the nation-state (both
Mexico and the U.S.) to be “irregular”, “undocumented”,
“unauthorized”, and/or “illegal”. Mexico has actively
policed and militarized its southern border, often using
multiple security forces at the municipal, state, and
federal levels as well as the military (WOLA 2015).
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The result has been a pattern of violent deterrence
and containment that places “unauthorized” migrants
on dangerous and secluded pathways, increases their
vulnerability, and makes them susceptible to human
rights violations by the same security forces who are
theoretically supposed to be respecting their rights as
outlined in Mexico’s 2011 Ley de Migración.
This article argues that due to the geographic proximity
between the U.S. and Mexico, border governance
in Mexico has not only been influenced by the U.S.
and pressured to be an extension of the U.S. border
regime, but the core politics surrounding the Mexico–
Guatemala border have not necessarily changed in
practice because these bordering tactics aim to stop
the movement of “undesirable” populations. These
policies of containment are typically presented with
political narratives of protection, such as the case the
with the Programa Frontera Sur (PFS) in 2014 (AnguloPasel 2019). However, on the ground, deterrence and
the restriction of movement, rather than protection,
appear to be the objectives of the Mexican government.
Nevertheless, while containing and disrupting irregular
migrant movements may be the principal objectives,
these policies and discourse have also created
resistance. Thus, this article further argues that the
Mexico–Guatemala “border”, in all its manifestations of
nation-state enforcement (practices of containment,
surveillance, intimidation, apprehension, detention,
deportation) is a site of struggle, which propels migrants
to resist through movement because these border
policies do not address the historical and sociopolitical
conditions that motivate this migration. Analyzing the
entanglement of border practices between Mexico
and the U.S. provides the opportunity to examine an
overlooked arena of the struggle between power
(Mexico’s border regime and punitive border practices)
and resistance (migrant survival strategies to travel
north).
This article primarily uses discourse and policy
analysis to observe how border policies, and narratives
surrounding those policies, are used to negatively
construct and frame “unauthorized” migrants as
security threats and/or criminals. This negative framing
sets the political agenda by “othering” migrants
through fear and justifies punitive policies (Pope 2020).
I also use data from fieldwork conducted in 2014 to
highlight the effects of these policies on migrants
and the struggles they face. The fieldwork consisted
of semi-structured interviews with migrants and key
informants, participant observation, and reflexive
journal field notes. It took place in the states of Veracruz
and Oaxaca. Theoretically, I employ critical border
studies, which allows us to analyze the intersections
of the nation-state’s border regime and migrants’
experiences and struggles. I utilize critical border
theory to question what borders are, who implements
border practices and to what end, where borders are
located on-the-ground, and how migrants try to regain

control over their movements vis-à-vis the power of the
nation-state.
After providing a history of the entanglement of the
border relations between the U.S. and Mexico, the article
will focus on two cases which showcase how the border
between Mexico and Guatemala is not only an extension
of the U.S. border regime, but more importantly, is also
a site of struggle between those who seek to contain
and those who seek to move. The first case involves
the two most recent presidencies in Mexico of Enrique
Peña Nieto and Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO).
The case of these two presidents offer an interesting
juxtaposition in that at first it appeared as though there
may have been a break from the “business as usual”
of hardline border enforcement through promises and
political rhetoric from AMLO, but the practices quickly
reverted back to the same tactics and techniques of
border control. This case highlights the use of power
and containment through discourse and policy. The
second case showcases migrant struggle through
resistance by examining the migrant “caravan”, which
has become a prominent strategy of resistance for
migrants as a result of border enforcement tactics.

Borders and Migration from a Critical
Standpoint
In order to critically examine the dynamics of the
southern border in Mexico, this article utilizes critical
border theory to understand how irregular migration
and migrants have been “othered” and represented as a
national security “threat”. As such, it is not necessarily all
migration that the Mexican government seeks to contain
and restrict, but rather a certain type of population
or as Khosravi (2011) notes, the control of movement
of those deemed “undesirable” by the nation-state.
Critical border scholars concentrate on the relationship
of migration and security to interrogate how and why
“unauthorized” migration has been connected to a
state’s national security discourse. Within discourse
and policy, migration has been socially and politically
constructed as a threat to be managed and controlled
(Walters 2010). This social construction of threat
occurs alongside political framing and agenda setting
which presents “unauthorized” migrants negatively as
criminals or “bogus” refugee claimants. This has been
referred to as a “border spectacle” (De Genova 2013)
whereby the state, through border enforcement, enacts
exclusion and (re)produces “illegalized” migration
as a category. The category of “illegal” is placed on
“selected migration streams and bodies while other
streams and bodies are marked as legal, professional,
student, allowable” (Casas-Cortes et al. 2015, 67).
Within the Mexican context, for instance, migrants
from Central American are differentially excluded by
being perceived as thieves, drug traffickers, rapists,
among others (Isacson et al. 2015). These narratives,
therefore, make it easier to justify militarized border
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security policies and enforcement operations. Given the
increasing xenophobia and local resentment towards
foreigners, Mexican citizens may feel this enforcement
is necessary given the threat “unauthorized” migrants
supposedly pose to their communities (International
Crisis Group 2018).
In essence, the securitization of migration is a part
of a wider politicization project, which negatively
characterizes “unauthorized” immigrants and/or
asylum-seekers as a challenge to national identity,
culture, and sense of belonging. Thus, since migrants
are framed and perceived as a “threat”, “unauthorized”
migration becomes a security “problem” to be dealt
with using institutional policies that protect public
security. According to Huysmans (2000), the security
problem (i.e. “unauthorized” migrants that seek to
destabilize public order) comes first and the border
policy is an instrumental reaction or a tactic/technique
to solve the “problem”. Therefore, the policy “protect[s]
the state, its society… against the dangers related to an
invasion of (illegal) immigrants and asylum-seekers”
(Huysmans 2000, 757).
Framing “unauthorized” migration and migrants as a
“threat” also reinforces the concept of “othering” as
these migrants are not part of the social cultural fabric.
Through the use of “us versus them” political narratives,
nation-state governments are able to objectify the
other. Additionally, these fabricated “threats” objectify
the other using elements of race and culture, which
shows existing post-colonial hierarchies (Aradau et
al. 2021). “Unauthorized” migration management,
therefore, effectively becomes a continuation of the
colonial project where foreigners are subjugated and
racialized (Walters 2010; Loyd et al. 2012; Walia 2021).
Overall, border policy becomes a political project
of belonging, of who belongs and who does not
(Yuval-Davis et al. 2019). Bordering practices, in turn,
can happen everywhere and in everyday life (Balibar
2002), not only at geographic boundaries like the
Mexico–Guatemala territorial line. As will be shown
below, border enforcement may begin at the southern
border but the “border”, in its many manifestations,
follows the “unauthorized” migrant throughout their
journeys. As such, the border follows and surrounds
“unauthorized” migrants because bordering processes
and practices have the potential to be materialized
anywhere (Nyers 2008; Khosravi 2011).
Alongside constructing negative narratives through
“threat” and “othering” discourses, the externalization
of border enforcement is another tactic used by
sovereign states to contain and restrict “unauthorized”
migration and is a key bordering practice that is directly
connected to the perception of migration as a “threat”.
According to Casas-Cortes et al. (2015), this process is
“based on the direct involvement of the externalizing
state’s border authorities in other countries’
sovereign territories, and outsourcing of border
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control responsibilities to another country’s national
surveillance forces” (73). Since nation-state actors view
the regulation of this migrant population as imperative
to protecting the country’s internal public security,
government officials need to ensure that this “threat”
does not reach its territorial border. At the same time,
if this population does reach and surpass the border,
border enforcement has to also shift internally within
the nation-state’s borders. These bordering practices
have been referred to as promoting a “delocalization”
of the border (Walters 2006), a “spatial stretching” of
the border (Amoore 2006), and/or the state’s “remote
control” (Lahav & Guiraudon 2000) whereby both state
and non-state actors may participate in the border
enforcement regime. Using externalization as a tactic
again challenges the conventional ways we think of
“borders” as territorial lines dividing nation-states since
policies related to border control can happen anywhere
(Balibar 2002) and not just at the official line between
two sovereign nation-states.
In addition, by critically exploring borders, we observe
that despite the continued attempts by the nation-state
to control, borders are difficult to regulate because they
are not only fixed territorial lines. States try to enact
their sovereign power by executing different tactics and
techniques to maintain territorial claims, but borders
become fluid and shifting boundaries. The “border” is
constituted as a transnational space, an “ambivalent
space at the fringe of two societies” (Biemann 2002,
1). By examining these shifting boundaries, we are able
to (re)define the border by “giving attention to the
fluidity of nation-state borders and the complexity of
the experiences of those who live in them and/or across
them” (Brambilla 2015). With this standpoint, we can
understand migration from the migrants’ perspective.
Thus, when observing the Mexico–Guatemala
borderlands, we can reconceptualize this space as a
site of struggle. A site of struggle between the nationstate’s border regime, which is trying to contain and
disrupt “unauthorized” migration, and, migrants,
who are resisting the state’s techniques of power
and domination and living everyday lives through the
struggle for survival. This type of migration can also
be looked upon as struggles over human mobility, or
the right to move (Sharma 2020). Within this struggle,
mobility or movement becomes the means of survival.
As Franck (2019) notes, these struggles “shed light on
both the consequences and limits of state power in the
attempts to control and discipline [migrants]” (22).
Furthermore, if we analyze migrants’ experiences, we
learn that they experience multiple struggles in their
journeys, but migrants are also capable of their own
tactics in order to break away from their sociopolitical
conditions and practice their right to move to survive.
Similarly, feminist border theory (Aaron et al. 2010;
Ruiz-Aho 2011) has paid particular attention to studying
marginalized voices, which are usually silent when
the referent object is the nation-state. Giving voice
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to marginalized populations deconstructs the power
hierarchies that borders create and, instead, centres
subaltern forms of knowledge. The case of migrant
“caravans” is a perfect example of how migrants seek
strategies within their control in order to achieve their
own goals of mobility. By examining borders through
the migrants’ perspective, I show that they are not
“threats” but rather claims-making agents, who seek,
and to the extent possible, request rights to which they
are entitled.
At the same time, however, it is also important not
to romanticize migrants as heroines who are able to
overcome all struggles of “unauthorized” migration.
There continues to be ongoing debates about structure
and agency with regards to migrant (im)mobility
(Papadopoulos & Tsianos 2013; Squire 2017). Migrants
may grapple with bordering practices beyond their
control, but they are not simply passive victims in this
migration space and can enact forms of resistance
albeit within a small space for action (Stierl 2020).
Therefore, during their journeys, migrants encounter
forms of constrained agency (Angulo-Pasel 2018).
In all, a migrant journey may start as an individual
movement but can quickly become a collective action.
Organized movements, like the so-called Central
American “caravans”, may seem like a simple act of
walking together. But, as part of the struggle, it also
resembles a political mobilization and creates a new
socio-political space to express themselves in solidarity.
Thus, through the exercise of movement, of walking
together, “collectively joining together in movement,
and through their movement, [they are] manifesting
their grievances or demands by appropriating space
and indeed producing a new space through their
movement” (Aradau et al. 2021, 16).
In sum, through the cases of the two latest presidents,
Peña Nieto and AMLO and the migrant caravans, we
will see how these migration struggles interact. But first,
I will provide a history of U.S.–Mexico border relations
which sets the scene for migrant struggles.

A History of Entanglement: Mexico–U.S.
Border Relations
To appreciate the dynamics of the Mexico–Guatemala
border, one needs to examine the entangled history and
relationship of the border that divides Mexico and the
U.S. Like many other borders that divide economically
prosperous regions from those labelled as either part of
the “developing world”, “Third World”, or the “South”,
geographic proximity to more affluent countries
creates more impetus for hard security policies.
Astutely, Anzaldua (1987) argues that the U.S.–Mexico
border is “una herida abierta [an open wound] where
the Third World grates against the first and bleeds”
(pg. 25). Furthermore, fear and insecurity are strong
drivers for the securitization of borders, especially

when “migrants attempt to cross between regions of
great economic disparity”(Mountz & Hiemstra 2014,
383). As such, with respect to border enforcement, the
Mexican–Guatemalan border can equally be seen as an
externalization of the U.S. border. In the last decade, it
may also be argued that Central American countries
such as Guatemala, for instance, are trying to contain
and disrupt the movement of “unauthorized” migrants,
and thus also become border enforcers for the U.S. For
example, in January 2021, the Guatemalan government
ordered the military to stop a migrant “caravan”
attempting to cross into Mexico, complete with tear gas
(Ochoa et al. 2021). This pattern of militarization within
the region reproduces images reminiscent of the civil
wars back in the 1980s.
Consequently, with respect to border enforcement
relations, Mexico has always had an intertwined
relationship with the U.S. As will be further elaborated
below with the examples of two Mexican administrations,
Mexico has been referred to as a “buffer state” and a
border enforcer for the U.S. Therefore, as many critics
point out (Ochoa et al. 2021), a central challenge
for Mexico continues to be its dependency on U.S.
border policy. This relationship has a tense history,
which can be traced back to Mexican independence
and the controversial war of North American Invasion
in 1846 where Mexico lost vast territory to the U.S.
Then, during World War II, the Bracero Program was
implemented between the two nation-states due to
the labour shortage in the U.S., where more than 4.5
million Mexican agricultural workers circulated in and
out of the U.S. for more than 20 years. Nevertheless,
despite the family ties this program cultivated, when
the program ended in 1965 and was replaced with the
Border Industrialization Program and the Immigration
and Nationality Act, the U.S. government did not
provide any legal pathway for immigrants to stay in
the U.S. The Border Industrialization Program was
the beginning of the maquiladora industry along the
Mexico–U.S. borderlands, which has created labour
exploitation by foreign-owned companies. While an
in-depth examination of these events and associated
border policies are beyond the scope of this article,
they are important in that they highlight Mexico’s
asymmetrical relationship with the U.S. and demonstrate
a source of resentment among Mexicans vis-à-vis their
dependency with respect to the U.S. being the principal
source of capital and the country who typically drives
the economic relationship.
Furthermore, the constant pressure by the U.S.
government to increase border enforcement and its
connection to containing “unauthorized” migration was
greatly influenced by the national security threat of the
drug war and its correlation to “unauthorized” migrants
who were perceived as the criminals participating in the
drug trade. In the early 1970s, the Nixon administration
declared the “War on Drugs” and perpetuated a
consistent rhetoric linking migrants and the drug trade,

29

_R

Borders in Globalization Review | Volume 3 | Issue 2 | Spring & Summer 2022
Angulo-Pasel, “The More Things Change ... Governance and Resistance along the Mexico–Guatemala Border”

_R

which furthered criminalized “foreigners” (Nevins 2001).
Therefore, Mexico has had a complicated history with
respect to migration. In 1976, the Mexican government
passed and implemented the General Law of the
Population. Whereas earlier laws focused on importing
foreigners to modernize and increase population
growth, these laws were amended to become more
restrictive to immigration in 1976. The resulting law was
unfavourable to immigrants, especially those found
to be entering Mexico without legal documentation.
At the same time, however, given the proximity to
the U.S., there was a strong history of emigration
(Fitzgerald 2005), which was encouraged as a form
of development through the use of remittances. The
migration-development nexus was in full force in Mexico,
and the image of the “migrant hero” (Sørensen 2012)
was well promoted among government officials. While
the Mexican government persuaded the U.S. to embark
on immigration reform for its nationals living in the U.S.,
the Law of the Population criminalized undocumented
migration (Garcia Aguilar 2015). In fact, it made it a
felony to enter Mexico without legal documents or to
be found with an expired visa; crimes punishable for
up to ten years imprisonment (Gonzalez-Murphy &
Koslowski 2011). This hypocrisy was recognized both
internally and externally as pressure mounted by civil
society organizations in Mexico, and U.S. government
officials, to “practice what you preach”.
The negative framing of irregular migrants continued into
the 1990s. The North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), which was implemented in 1994, created
contradictions where policies facilitated and increased
trade and opened markets and access to cheap Mexican
labour, but paid little attention to allowing the mobility
of this cheap Mexican labour. Furthermore, NAFTA’s
economic policy increased the number of Mexican
farmers and workers seeking job opportunities by
privatizing collective farms thus eliminating agricultural
subsidies, deregulating agriculture, and selling land to
foreign investors (Fernández-Kelly & Massey 2007).
While NAFTA created disparities, inequalities, and
displacement among Mexicans, the U.S. government
implemented several border enforcement operations
along the U.S. Southwest border, including Operation
Hold the Line/Blockade (1993) in El Paso, Texas and
Operation Gatekeeper (1994) in San Diego, California.
The social construction of the criminal irregular migrant
was distinct from the trusted business travelers whose
movements were not only allowed but encouraged with
the implementation of NAFTA. Thus, the securitization
of the border and militarization of border enforcement
is dependent on the population in question. Prior to
NAFTA, U.S. border policy had already begun a more
restrictive pattern with the 1986 Immigration Reform
and Control Act, where the government actively
criminalized the hiring of “unauthorized” workers
by U.S. employers and began to increase funding for
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) as well as Border
Patrol (BP) agents.
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When Vicente Fox came to power in 2000, there was
increasing pressure to change restrictive immigration
laws in Mexico. The Fox administration was able to
secure bilateral immigration reform discussions with
George W. Bush but the attacks of September 11, 2001
(9/11) halted all negotiations from moving forward. With
respect to migration management, the norm in both the
U.S. and Mexico became to increase the securitization
of “unauthorized” migrants. Prior to 9/11, however, the
national security discourse vis-à-vis irregular migrants
had been established by the Fox administration with
the implementation of Plan Sur. However, its objectives
were remarkably reinforced after 9/11 as Plan Sur’s
intentions clearly linked the control of illicit flows, such
as drugs and arms, as well as “unauthorized” migrants
by explicitly promoting the control and vigilance of
migration flows “from the Isthmus of Tehuantepec to the
southern border” (Garcia Aguilar 2015, 60). This political
narrative illustrates how “unauthorized” migration
becomes embedded in the national security discourse.
The securitization of migrants in Mexico continued
in 2002, when the U.S. and Mexico established the
Smart Border: 22 Point Agreement (Office of the Press
Secretary 2002), which sought to enhance control and
security at Mexico’s southern border. Throughout these
policies, civil society groups within Mexico continued
to criticize the government for its lack of commitment
to the protection of migrant rights in favour of national
security objectives and kept pressing the government
to develop reforms to its restrictive migration policies.
This explicit conflation between “unauthorized”
migrants, and illicit flows like illegal drugs and arms
was not only an increasingly accepted narrative
among the public, but was further solidified by the
Calderon (2006–2012) administration, when together
with U.S. support, it launched the Mérida Initiative and
the “war on drugs and organized crime”. The Mérida
Initiative was a foreign aid package that combined
economic, technical, and intelligence aid in order to
combat organized crime (which included transnational
migration) all in the name of “defending sovereignty
and national security” (Garcia Aguilar 2015, 61; Benítez
Manaut 2011). One of the main pillars of the policy,
for example, included creating a 21st Century Border
Structure which would “facilitate legitimate commerce
and movement of people while curtailing the illicit flow
of drugs, people, arms, and cash” [emphasis added]
(Ocampomi 2021). As a result, since 2006, Mexico
experienced an extreme rise in violence throughout the
country. During Calderon’s tenure, over 40,000 people
were killed in military operations and inter-cartel
violence (Mercille 2011). The following sections examine
the two latest Mexican administrations to highlight the
exercises of power the nation-state enacts to control
and contain “undesirable” migrant populations and the
correlation to U.S. political pressure to extend its border
enforcement regime; and, how migrants, despite these
border tactics, exercise their rights and resist through
organized collective movement.
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Exercises of Nation-State Power
Peña Nieto’s Border Policy
With respect to border enforcement, the Peña Nieto
administration followed the security patterns set
forth by the Calderon administration. Enrique Peña
Nieto is perhaps most (in)famously known for the
border policy the Programa Frontera Sur (PFS) or the
Southern Border Plan, which highlights how discourse
and policy continued to be used to “other” and
contain “unauthorized” migrants. Together with the
Guatemalan administration, the PFS was launched in
July 2014. The PFS was the latest iteration of Mexican
border policy, which although claimed to want to
achieve migrant safety, protection, and the respect
of migrant rights, actually had detrimental effects
on migrants crossing Mexico. Furthermore, when
examining the events surrounding the implementation
of this policy, we discover that this governance directive
was plainly influenced by what was happening in the
U.S. borderlands during the same time period. Until
this point, Peña Nieto’s immigration policy had been
fairly discreet. As a Partido Revolucionario Institucional
(PRI) candidate, migration did not appear to be a
central campaign issue, nor initially a top priority for his
administration (Alba 2013).
According to the Peña Nieto government, the principal
objective of the PFS policy was to “protect and
safeguard the human rights of migrants entering and
transiting through Mexico and to regulate international
crossings so as to increase the development and security
of the region” (Presidencia de la Republica 2014). This
objective, however, appears to promote two seemingly
contradictory narratives—one which seeks to protect the
human rights of migrants and the other which increases
the security of the region. When the PFS was launched,
it outlined five distinct action items. Four of the five
items relate to border security and controlling migratory
movements; all, however, in the name of the migrant’s
safety and protection. The principal aim appeared to be to
devote funds and enforcement resources to the southern
border region to lower the number of U.S.-bound
“unauthorized” migrants (Castañeda 2016). This plan
involved increasing checkpoints along major train routes
and highways travelling northbound and setting up
raids within the interior of the country where migrants
may be found (ie. hotels, motels, etc.). In particular, the
enforcement operations on the cargo train referred
to as “La Bestia” were most visible where “migration
authorities… blocked migrants from boarding trains,
[and] pulled migrants off of trains” (Isacson et al. 2015).
In all, this immigration security crackdown along the
southern border prompted concerns from international
organizations and non-governmental organizations
about the excessive use of force by Mexican authorities
(WOLA 2015; Boggs 2015; Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights (IACHR) 2015).

Once more, the context behind this policy is important
to note as it highlights the entanglement of Mexico’s
border security relationship with the U.S. During
the summer of 2014, the Obama administration
established bilateral negotiations with the Mexican
government after the U.S. declared a humanitarian
crisis at its southern border due to the high volume
of unaccompanied children that were attempting to
achieve safe passage into the U.S. There was intense
media attention surrounding this “crisis”, which showed
overwhelmed Border Patrol personnel and facilities as
well as discontent among the public in border states
(Conlon 2014). The Obama administration sought
cooperation and applied political pressure to the Peña
Nieto administration to contain the “flow” of irregular
migrants travelling to the U.S., ostensibly “stretching”
its border enforcement objectives and promoting the
use of Mexican border enforcement as a buffer state
or a stopgap for “unauthorized” migration. The security
crackdown was successful in apprehending and
deporting thousands of migrants coming from Central
America with approximately a 71 percent increase
in apprehensions between July 2014 and June 2015
compared to the same period the previous year (Isacson
et al. 2015). Furthermore, in 2015, Mexico apprehended
more Central American migrants when compared to
its U.S. counterpart: 174,529 apprehended in Mexico
(SEGOB-INM 2015) versus 145,316 apprehended by the
U.S. (U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2016). As can
be observed from Figures 1 and 2 below, it is clear that
the consequences of the PFS from Mexico’s perspective
was to implement a policy of containment in the southern
border region and boost deportations.
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Figure 1: Apprehensions/Detentions at the Southern Border.
Southern border states included in this chart are Chiapas,
Campeche, Tabasco, and Quintana Roo. Source: SEGOB-INM
2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 (Compiled by author).
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Figure 2: Mexico’s Deportations by Year. Source: SEGOB2012
2013
2014
2015
INM 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 (Compiled by author).

AMLO’s Border Policy
When the Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO)
administration came into power in December 2018, there
were high expectations among civil society leaders
that the hard security policies vis-à-vis “unauthorized”
migrants that Peña Nieto had implemented would
change (Ruiz et al. 2020). First, politically, AMLO was
very different from his predecessor. He was from the
progressive party, MORENA, which he founded in
2014 after losing two presidential runs, citing electoral
fraud. In comparison to the PRI party, the MORENA
party represented a progressive leftist position, which
advocated for members of the underclass, equality,
and social justice (Chouza 2014). Second, with regards
to “unauthorized” migration, AMLO advocated for a
social and economic development approach in the
southern border region to address the root causes of
migration rather than Peña Nieto’s security approach.
His objective was to foster development with major
infrastructure and social projects, which in turn would
help reduce migration (Vega 2019). Originally, President
AMLO promised to promote a more humanitarian
approach to migration. His new administration pledged
to change Mexico’s migration policy and placed
migrant rights defenders in key policy positions (Ruiz
et al. 2020). Thus, despite the previous administration’s
punitive detention and deportation policies and U.S.
President Donald Trump’s relentless attacks on “illegal”
immigration and xenophobic remarks towards both
Mexican and Central American migrants, AMLO, even
prior to his election victory, campaigned on the need
to protect Central American migrants and defend their
human rights (López Obrador 2018).
Nevertheless, the complex and dependent border
relationship between the U.S. and Mexico proved to
make the push towards a more humanitarian approach
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to “unauthorized” migration difficult. What has been
dubbed the “Trump Effect” in the U.S. had negative
consequences on Mexican border policy. In particular,
there are two relevant factors that have directly
influenced border policy, and both culminated with
the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP) or the “Stay
in Mexico” policy. First, there was the “Zero Tolerance”
policies, which began to be formulated in 2017, but
would not be formally introduced until April 2018. The
immigration policies associated with “Zero Tolerance”
further criminalized irregular migrants by convicting
any migrant with a felony crime if they crossed into the
U.S. unlawfully. This set of policies not only justified the
separation of families, but also reproduced the divisive
“othering” narrative and xenophobic rhetoric of the
“illegal” migrant.
Second, there was the migrant exodus from Central
America that was referred to as “migrant caravans”
and began in October 2018. The Trump administration
continued to fabricate an “invasion” narrative using fear
of criminals trying to attack the U.S. as a justification
for its policies. Again, there was a clear pattern of
associating this population with a national security
emergency, a narrative that was “reliant on creating a
sense of siege” (Pope 2020). In Mexico, these events
were occurring during AMLO’s presidential campaign
and then while he was President-Elect. Even before he
assumed the presidency, however, AMLO was vocal with
his support of the members of the migrant “caravans”
and offered to provide them with humanitarian
protections. Once in office in January 2019, the Instituto
Nacional de Migración (INM), under the direction of the
AMLO administration, began granting humanitarian
visas with the right to work to “caravan” members
who entered through Tapachula, Chiapas (Joseph et
al. 2019). This humanitarian visa process was much
different than the more arduous application process for
humanitarian visas during the PFS era under Peña Nieto,
which could take up to 5 months to obtain and did not
provide a work permit (Angulo-Pasel 2021). The INM
named this humanitarian visa process the Programa
Emergente de Emisión de Tarjetas de Visitante por
Razones Humanitarias [Emergent Program for the
Granting of Visitor for Humanitarian Reasons Cards],
which included an expedited screening and interview
process and typically took five days (Ruiz et al. 2020).
The program proved to be very successful in that by
January 23, 2019, there were already 8,727 applications
for this humanitarian visa (Secretaría de Gobernación
(SEGOB) 2019).
Yet, the Trump administration’s constant focus on
“unauthorized” migration coming from Mexico and
the multiple migrant “caravans” in the early months
of AMLO’s presidency, escalated the political pressure
from the U.S. This pressure, along with an overwhelming
number of applicants for this new type of humanitarian
visa, abruptly halted AMLO’s policy prerogatives. More
specifically, the policy shift from the promised humane
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approach to “unauthorized” migration towards more
enforcement-based tactics began to take shape after
President Trump threatened to impose escalating trade
tariffs on Mexican goods entering the U.S. if the Mexican
government did not do more to stop the flow of “illegal”
migrants coming to the U.S.–Mexico border; thus, laying
bare the dependent economic relationship between the
two nation-states. The tariffs would start at 5 percent
and could eventually increase to 25 percent (Shear &
Haberman 2019). The AMLO government, aware that
the U.S. is Mexico’s number one economic trading
partner, knew these tariffs would have detrimental
effects on the economy and its popular support. Thus,
after a series of bilateral negotiations, all of the factors
mentioned above culminated in the U.S.–Mexico Joint
Declaration and Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP),
otherwise known as the “Remain in Mexico” policy.
With this agreement, the Mexican government would
actively crackdown on migration enforcement at the
Mexican southern border and the U.S. would be able
“to send asylum seekers back to Mexico to wait for
their immigration hearings in the United States” (Meyer
& Isacson 2019, 8). According to official statistics from
the INM, apprehensions and detentions in the southern
states which make up the borderlands with Guatemala
(Chiapas, Campeche, Tabasco, Quintana Roo) and
overall deportations rose again: apprehensions and
detentions from 73,176 in 2018 to 98,076 in 2019; and
deportations from 115,686 in 2018 to 149,812 in 2019
(SEGOB-INM 2018; 2019). Once more, similar to the
Peña Nieto administration, the new AMLO government
found itself acting as an external border enforcer for the
U.S., and border practices reverted back to displaying
the nation-state’s enforcement power.

The Role of the National Guard
Shortly after the bilateral agreement was reached
between the two countries in June 2019, the threat
of tariffs was withdrawn, and the border enforcement
efforts increased. The AMLO administration employed
a new border enforcement technique by deploying
the recently created National Guard to the Mexico–
Guatemala border to stop “unauthorized” migrants
from entering Mexico. Reminiscent of the PFS policy,
this militarized security force set up checkpoints
along major highways and train routes. There was also
accounts that immigration officials raided migrant
shelters (Lakhani 2019). Overall, in Mexico, there were
and are many concerns with this new security force.
First, despite claims to the contrary, the National Guard
consists primarily of military or ex-military personnel
who have been deployed to assist in migration
enforcement. According to a report by the Washington
Office on Latin America (WOLA), the National Guard
was to assume all federal policing functions where “the
government expected that most Federal Police agents
would move over to the new force, but this has not
been the case” (Meyer 2020). Instead, three quarters
of the National Guard members are from the army or

the navy. Given their broad powers in civilian policing
and public security tasks, there are major concerns
with using army and navy soldiers due to the lack of
accountability and the expanding militarized nature of
public security in Mexico (Meyer 2020). In June 2019,
the National Guard deployed approximately 21,500
officers as part of the surge of border enforcement
operations along the southern border (Ruiz et al. 2020).
However, using guardsmen for migration issues further
militarizes the border and raises human rights concerns
due to the lack of human rights training or interaction
with vulnerable populations the guardsmen receive
(Meyer & Isacson 2019). As a result, there have been
multiple reports of members of the National Guard
“assisting” the INM in border enforcement operations,
actively preventing migrant “caravans” from travelling
to and through Mexico, including physically abusing
migrants with riot gear, using tear gas, and forcing
them on buses to take them back to Tapachula (Abbott
2020; Tucker 2020; Meyer 2020).

Exercises of Migrant Resistance
Altogether these border enforcement policies affect
the lived experiences of migrants who attempt
to achieve safe passage throughout Mexico. They
encounter a journey of violence, which begins as soon
as that decision is made to migrate; as they prepare to
enter a clandestine space. Through migrant knowledge
networks, they are aware that their journey will be long
and dangerous, but they still move. This act of moving
is a form of resistance; they move despite nation-state
governments telling them otherwise. Throughout my
fieldwork, I found that despite their struggles, migrants
are aware that movement is their strategy for survival.
They know they are going against the power and laws
of the nation-state, but they still move. Thus, through
their movement, migrants challenge the border regime
and existing structures because that is how they
survive. No matter how small, the power to move and
resist borders is still there. I encountered migrants who
had been victims of physical and sexual assault, as well
as kidnapping and extortion. The journey may involve
walking for days through the most secluded fields and
developing blisters the size of rocks on the bottom
of one’s feet and/or it may involve trying to board a
deadly freight train as a mode of transportation, which
can amputate or kill people. Overall, it involves palpable
fear and distrust of anyone and everyone along the
journey, including the authorities that are supposed
to “protect” but instead abuse. The journey is full of
precarity, liminality, and vulnerability, but they still move.
Within this migration space, which is filled with struggles
between those who seek to contain and control, and
those who seek to move, migrants find strategies to
survive their migratory journeys, reclaim control over their
movements, and overcome the power of the “border”.
“Unauthorized” migrants move because they have been
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forcibly displaced by various forms of structural violence,
which excludes and marginalizes them (Hyndman
2004). Bordering practices that disrupt and criminalize
a population intercept rather than address root causes of
forced displacement and migration. For instance, not only
are there great economic inequalities in Central America,
but this inequality is caused by a history of exploitation
and rural displacement, which makes it difficult to obtain
a sustainable livelihood. Initially, AMLO appeared willing
to address socio-economic development but his policies
reverted back to containment.
Consequently, the Guatemala–Mexico border is a site of
constant struggle between the power of the nation-state
and the strategies of survival and resistance migrants
use to travel north. One such strategy is what has been
referred to as the migrant “caravan”, although migrant
activists choose to call these movements a migrant
exodus to bring attention to the unlivable situation
this population faces. Caravans have become more
visible, larger and more widely discussed. This is due
to the increased use of social media (i.e. Facebook) for
organizing, increased safety for migrants, and increased
media attention (Sieff & Partlow 2018). This form of
organization and migrant resistance became especially
known in October 2018 when it received ample media
attention and wrath from the Trump administration.
This particular migrant “caravan” grew to approximately
4,000 people and its members were primarily from
Honduras (Roberts 2018). Nonetheless, it is important to
note that these movements are not necessarily new, but
rather, have gained more momentum and recognition in
the last five years. In fact, for the last decade or so, there
have been yearly migrant “caravans” throughout Mexico,
two prominent ones being the Viacrucis Migrante
which began in 2010 (Garrido 2018) and the mothers of
missing migrants, which travels north every year looking
for their missing loved ones (Kron 2016). Civil society
groups, like Pueblo Sin Fronteras, typically organize
these movements as “an affirmative protest mobilization
against unjust border and immigration policies” (Tazzioli
& De Genova 2020, 877).
There are three prominent reasons why migrants use
this survival strategy. One has to do with the issues of
security and safety. “Unauthorized” migrants are preyed
upon by both state and non-state actors. Members of
criminal gangs frequent secluded areas to kidnap and
extort migrants. Similarly, federal, state, and municipal
authorities abuse and extort people along migrant
trajectories. During my fieldwork, I encountered many
migrants with stories about their border violence. One
story involved a 14-year-old boy who I met at a migrant
shelter. Like others, he was escaping violence in his
home country of Honduras. When I met him, he was
in the process of applying for a humanitarian status in
Mexico because he had been gang raped by a group
of men. Another story involves a woman, also from
Honduras, who was fleeing her country without her
children in hopes of finding safe passage to the U.S. to
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claim asylum. She wanted to immigrate to the U.S. and
then bring her children to join her. When I met her, she
was travelling with a man, who I first believed was her
spouse. Upon speaking with them, however, I found out
that this man was setting out on his journey again within
the next couple of days while she was staying behind.
Up until this point, they had been travelling together
and pretending to be a couple so that the woman
would not be harassed or sexually abused by others on
their journey. In return for this “protection”, there was
an understanding that there was an exchange of sexual
relations. Given the gender-based violence that occurs
on the journey through Mexico, she felt safer in this
partnership. Thus, “caravans” allow migrants to travel
in groups which affords them more security during
their journeys versus travelling alone. There is strength
and safety in numbers, especially when there is press
attention. Together these migrants also show resistance
to border policies by using their right to move together
despite governments’ attempts to stop them.
Second, travelling in large groups that have been
organized by civil society means that migrants do not
have to acquire the services of coyotes and/or polleros.
Coyotes/polleros are migration facilitators who charge
a fee in order to help smuggle migrants through Mexico
and into the U.S. As border enforcement and control
continues to escalate, the need for coyotes and the cost
of acquiring their services also increases. As pathways
in Mexico become more violent and dangerous, the
service becomes more expensive to account for the risk
involved in the journey; services can range from $5000
to $10,000 dollars (Isacson et al. 2015). Lastly, travelling
in large groups, which are organized by civil society,
is a collective social protest of resistance that fosters
solidarity among its members. Within this migrant
struggle, this form of collective mobility is a social
movement that serves to call attention to, and bears
witness to the gang violence, poverty, inequality, and
environmental devastation its members endure (Wurtz
2020). It is a form of resistance that seeks to identify
social and political demands and fights for the rights
of its members; the right to move, the right to seek
asylum, the right to a life free from violence, the right to
survive. Therefore, through the exercise of movement
and resistance, migrants that organize and walk in
“caravans” are not victims, but claims-making agents
who can regain control of the narrative by demanding
the rights of asylum to which they are entitled. These
social movements will continue as a strategy as long as
the conditions in their home countries persist.

Conclusion
In sum, Mexico’s southern border with Guatemala is
an important site of struggle, which requires more
attention. When we examine this border, we discover
that territorial borders are but a line on the sand
(Parker & Vaughan-Williams 2009). In reality and
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on-the-ground, this border manifests in many forms; it
is an invisible wall. It is the checkpoints along highways
and train routes, it is the raids at motels where migrants
frequent, it is tear gas and riot gear worn by National
Guard members, and, paradoxically it is primarily said
to be done in the name of the “protection and safety”
of migrants. Although this border is an important site
of study, it is also similar to other borders around the
world where bordering practices are used as techniques
of containment to restrict the movement of unwanted
populations.
My research shows that when borders divide a relatively
affluent state from one deemed to be a “developing”
country, hardline security policies through “othering”
discourse and policy are justified and endorsed to
deter “unauthorized” migrants. It also shows that
when we examine the border as bordering practices,
we can easily observe how the more affluent state can
use its political and economic leverage to extend and
spatially stretch its border enforcement regime into
an entire region and to multiple territorial borders. The
Mexico–Guatemala border becomes an overlooked
site of struggle, which shows the relations of power
and resistance. By analyzing the Peña Nieto and López
Obrador administrations, we can see how the border
security relations between the U.S. and Mexico are
entangled, but also how the nation-state enforces its
power through containment tactics. By examining
migrant strategies of survival, like migrant “caravans”,
we discover how this nation-state power interacts with
migrants’ forms of resistance.
Even though irregular migrants suffer countless
numbers of human rights violations, from sexual assaults
and beatings, to kidnapping and extortion, they are
agents with rights and display resilience despite their
vulnerabilities. As long as the root causes of corruption,
violence, inequality, and poverty, among others, are not
legitimately acknowledged and addressed, migrants
will continue to move north for a sustainable livelihood
and a life that is free from violence. Their movement is
their survival strategy. Their movement is their form of
resistance to demand basic human rights. Travelling in
“caravans” demonstrates their solidarity, their agency
as claims-making individuals, and their commitment to
finding a better life. This is a form a social protest that
calls attention to their living conditions and also actually
takes into account migrants’ safety and security.
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